Method 1.0.0 · Export schema 1.0.0
How the mapper produces a control plan
The mapper is a deterministic union over versioned relations. The same validated registries, answers and generation timestamp produce the same ordered record and byte-identical JSON, CSV and Markdown exports.
This is decision support, not certification. It does not calculate security, confidence, maturity or compliance scores.
1. Input model and three-state evidence
The input schema contains eleven stable criterion IDs. Each accepts exactly yes, no or unknown. A record with a missing, extra or invalid criterion is rejected rather than inferred.
- Yes
- The capability or exposure exists inside the assessed boundary.
- No
- The team has evidence that it does not exist inside that boundary. "Not planned" is not automatically "no."
- Unknown
- The evidence is insufficient. The engine records the criterion under
unresolvedInputsand setsINSUFFICIENT_SCOPE_EVIDENCE.
Presets contain all eleven answers. They are editable examples, not classifications of a product. The engine receives the selected values rather than the preset name.
2. Predicate grammar
Every mapping relation has a stable ID, unique integer priority, threat ID, control ID and an all predicate. Each predicate term compares one criterion ID with one allowed answer. An empty all list is a baseline relation; otherwise every term must match exactly. The following predicate excerpt comes from MAP-008 in the published registry.
{
"id": "MAP-008",
"priority": 80,
"when": { "all": [
{ "criterionId": "untrusted_external_content", "equals": "yes" },
{ "criterionId": "action_capable_tools", "equals": "yes" }
]},
"threatId": "THR-INDIRECT-INJECTION",
"controlId": "CTL-UNTRUSTED-ISOLATION",
"requirementLevel": "required"
}The grammar intentionally has no probabilistic weights, hidden defaults or negative inference. A relation is either matched by the submitted evidence or it is not.
3. Union algorithm and ordering
- Validate the registry graph and resolve every referenced layer, criterion, threat, attack stage, control, claim and source.
- Validate that the answer set contains each criterion exactly once.
- Evaluate all matching relations; do not stop at the first match.
- Union their controls by stable control ID.
- If repeated relations assign different levels, retain
requiredoverrecommended. - Retain every activating mapping ID, related threat and interrupted attack stage so the selection remains explainable.
- Order controls by the lowest activating mapping priority, then layer order, then control order and stable ID.
- Inject
generatedAtonce and freeze the result used by every exporter.
The union algorithm means one answer can activate several protections, and one protection can be justified by several attack paths. Deduplication never discards those reasons.
4. Result and control snapshot schema
The result record contains the method and schema versions, status, provisional flag, input answers, unresolved inputs, matched mappings and threats, ordered control snapshots and the supplied generation timestamp. It also embeds the selected bounded claims and source records, so an export remains reviewable without silently resolving IDs against a later registry publication.
| Field | Purpose |
|---|---|
id, name, layerId, requirementLevel | Stable identity, readable label, containment layer and required-over-recommended resolution. |
objective, functions, implementation | What the safeguard changes and whether it prevents, detects, contains or supports recovery. |
verification, evidenceArtifacts, standardRefs | The test to perform, expected records and versioned standard crosswalk references. |
suggestedOwnerRole | A planning prompt. It does not assert that a named person accepted accountability. |
activatingMappingIds, threats, stages, claims, sources | The trace from exposure to rationale and evidence boundary. |
releaseGateWhenRequired | Whether a matched required relation creates a release gate under this model. It is not a deployment approval. |
5. Deterministic exports
JSON is the lossless machine-readable record. CSV uses one row per selected control and quotes delimiter, quote and newline characters. Markdown is the human-review view with status, unresolved inputs and headed control records. All three exporters consume the same immutable result and never call the clock independently.
Determinism is scoped to identical validated registries, answers, method version and generatedAt. A new generation action intentionally creates a new record and timestamp. Changing any form answer marks the visible record stale, clears it and disables all export controls.
6. Registry graph and validation
Canonical registries define criteria, six ordered layers, threats and attack stages, controls, mapping relations, profiles, incidents, claims, sources and methodology. Public mirrors are byte-for-byte copies. A release check rejects duplicate IDs or priorities, unresolved references, invalid URLs, missing evidence fields, layers outside the six-layer sequence and a derived CSV that differs from the mappings registry.
Registry validation establishes internal consistency; it does not prove the controls were correctly implemented in a target system. Implementation evidence requires a separate technical review.
Inspect the tested records directly: controls, mapping relations, bounded claims, dated sources, incident evidence, method contract and the normalized control matrix CSV.
7. Claim-to-source boundary
A claim record contains a bounded statement and source IDs. A control or mapping can cite several claims and official sources. The registry distinguishes standards, specifications, official guidance, researcher disclosures and incident records so editorial interpretation is not presented as an issuing organization's certification or endorsement.
Official sources are preferred for standards, specifications and vulnerability facts. The six-layer grouping and AISVS references are editorial crosswalks; OWASP, NIST, MCP and SLSA do not certify this mapper. The EchoLeak entry separates the MSRC vulnerability record from Aim Labs' proof-of-concept report and from any claim of confirmed exploitation.
| ID and source | Publisher | Published / verified | Status | Use boundary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 · NIST AI 100-2e2025 | NIST | / | NIST AI report, corrected 1 Apr 2025 | Adversarial-ML taxonomy, not an agent control baseline or certification. |
| S02 · Agent hijacking evaluations | NIST | / | Technical blog | Task-specific evaluation guidance; results do not generalize beyond tested attacks and systems. |
| S03 · Agentic Top 10 2026 | OWASP GenAI Security Project | / | Community risk taxonomy | Threat awareness, not certification, endorsement or a complete implementation specification. |
| S04 · Securing Agentic Applications 1.0 | OWASP GenAI Security Project | / | Community implementation guide | General practices that still require system-specific threat modeling and verification. |
| S05 · MCP Authorization 2026-07-28 | Model Context Protocol | / | Protocol specification | Transport authorization; it does not authorize a concrete business action or cover every runtime control. |
| S06 · Agent identity and authorization | NIST NCCoE | / | Initial public draft concept paper | Project scoping, not final NIST guidance or a conformity assessment. |
| S07 · SLSA v1.2 | SLSA | / | Specification | Provenance helps only when it is verified against expectations and a trusted root. |
| S08 · NIST SP 800-218A | NIST | / | Special Publication | AI secure-development practices, not validation of a particular agent dependency or release. |
| S09 · LLM Top 10 2026 | OWASP GenAI Security Project | / | Community risk taxonomy | LLM application risks, not an agent-specific certification or complete catalog. |
| S10 · CVE-2025-32711 | Microsoft Security Response Center | / | Vendor vulnerability record | Command injection and network disclosure facts; no proof-of-concept mechanism or breach claim. |
| S11 · Breaking down EchoLeak | Cato Networks / Aim Labs | / | Researcher technical report | PoC mechanism and attributed customer-impact statement; not evidence of in-the-wild exploitation. |
| S12 · OWASP AISVS 1.0 | OWASP | / | Verification standard | Versioned control references; the mapper's crosswalk is not an AISVS conformance assessment. |
8. Updates, exceptions and corrections
Each source record carries a verification date and, where available, a publication date and document status. A material change to criteria, predicate meaning, ordering, result fields or export columns requires a method or export-schema version change. Source clarifications and mapping corrections receive an editorial release entry.
Exceptions belong in the adopting team's own risk record with owner, rationale, compensating control, residual risk, approval and expiry. The public mapper does not store user answers or exceptions. Report a correction through the repository issue tracker with the affected stable ID and a primary source.
- Published
- Sources last verified
- Independent review
- Not independently reviewed.
- Drafting disclosure
- AI-assisted drafting with deterministic registry, contract and release checks.